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In this paper we assess the economic viability of innovation by producers relative to two 
increasingly important alternative models: innovations by single user individuals or firms, and 
open collaborative innovation projects. We analyze the design costs and architectures and 
communication costs associated with each model.  We conclude that innovation by individual 
users and also open collaborative innovation increasingly compete with - and may displace –
producer innovation in many parts of the economy. We argue that a transition from producer 
innovation to open single user and open collaborative innovation is desirable in terms of social 
welfare, and so worthy of support by policymakers.   
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Modeling a Paradigm Shift: 
From Producer Innovation to Open User and Collaborative Innovation 
 
1.  Introduction and overview 
Ever  since  Schumpeter  (1934)  promulgated  his  theory  of  economic  development, 
economists, policymakers and business managers have assumed that the dominant mode of 
innovation is a “producers’ model.” That is, it has been assumed that most important designs 
for innovations would originate from producers and be supplied to consumers via goods and 
services that were for sale.  This view seemed reasonable on the face of it – producer-innovators 
generally  profit  from  many  users,  each  purchasing  and  using  a  single,  producer-developed 
design.  Individual user innovators, in contrast, depend only on their own in-house use of their 
design  to  recoup  their    innovation-related  investments.    Presumably,  therefore,  a  producer 
serving many customers can afford to invest more in an innovation design than can any single 
user.  From  this  it  has  been  generally  assumed  that  producer-developed  designs  should 
dominate user-developed designs in most parts of the economy.  
This long-held view of innovation has, in turn, led to public policies based on a theory of 
producer incentives. Producers, it is argued, are motivated to innovate by the expectation of 
profits.  These profits will disappear if anyone can simply copy producers’ innovations, and 
therefore, producers must be granted subsidies or intellectual property rights that give them 
exclusive control over their innovations for some period of time. (Machlup and Penrose, 1951; 
Teece, 1986; Gallini and Scotchmer, 2006.) 
However,  the  producers’  model  is  only  one  mode  of  innovation.    Two  increasingly 
important  additional  models  are  innovations  by  single  user  firms  or  individuals,  and  open 
collaborative  innovation  projects.  Each  of  these  three  forms  represents  a  different  way  to 
organize human effort and investments aimed at generating valuable new innovations. In the 
body of this paper we will analyze these three models in terms of their technological properties, 
specifically their design costs and architecture, and their communication requirements. In these 
two  technological  dimensions,  each  model  has  a  different  profile  that  gives  it  economic 
advantages under some conditions and disadvantages in others.   
Our modeling of design costs and architectures and communication costs allows us to 
place bounds on the contexts in which each model will be economically viable.  Our analysis 
will  lead  us  to  conclude  that  innovation  by  individual  users  and  also  open  collaborative 
innovation are modes of innovating that increasingly compete with and may displace producer 
innovation  in  many  parts  of  the  economy.    This  shift  is  being  driven  by  new  technologies,    
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specifically  the  transition  to  increasingly  digitized  and  modularized  design  and  production 
practices, coupled with the availability of very low-cost, Internet-based communication.   
We  will  argue  that  when  it  is  technologically  feasible,  the  transition  from  closed 
producer  or  single  user  innovation  to  open  single  user  or  collaborative  innovation  is  also 
desirable in terms of social welfare, hence worthy of support by policymakers.  This is due to 
the free dissemination of innovation designs associated with the open model. Open innovation 
generates innovation without exclusivity or monopoly, and so should improve social welfare 
other things equal.  
In section 2 of this paper we review relevant literature.  In section 3 we present and 
explain conditions under which each of the three economic models of innovation we describe is 
viable.  In section 4, we discuss some broader patterns related to our models, and also suggest 
some  implications  of  open  collaborative  innovation  for  researchers,  practitioners,  and 
policymakers. 
2. Literature review 
In  this  section,  we  briefly  review  the  literature  on  user  innovation,  on  openness  of 
intellectual property, and on modular designs and collaborative innovation. 
2.1 Innovation by users 
Users, as we define the term, are firms or individual consumers that expect to benefit 
from using a design, a product or a service. In contrast, producers expect to benefit from selling a 
design, a product, or a service. Innovation user and innovation producer are thus two general 
“functional”  relationships  between  innovator  and  innovation.  Users  are  unique  in  that  they 
alone  benefit  directly  from  innovations.  Producers  must  sell  innovation-related  products  or 
services to users, hence the value of innovation to producers is derived from users’ willingness 
to pay. Thus, in order to profit, inventors must sell or license knowledge related to their new 
designs; manufacture and sell goods embodying the innovations; or deliver and sell services 
incorporating or complementing the innovations.  
Qualitative observations have long indicated that important process improvements are 
developed by employees working for firms that use them. Adam Smith (1776) pointed out the 
importance of “the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labor, 
and enable one man to do the work of many.” Smith went on to note that “a great part of the 
machines made use of in those manufactures in which labor is most subdivided, were originally 
the invention of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in some very simple 
operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods of    
    
  4 
performing it.” Rosenberg (1976) studied the history of the US machine tool industry and found 
that important and basic machine types like lathes and milling machines were first developed 
and  built  by  user  firms  having  a  strong  need  for  them.  Textile  manufacturing  firms,  gun 
manufacturers  and  sewing  machine  manufacturers  were  important  early  user  developers  of 
machine tools.  
Quantitative studies of user innovation document that many of the most important and 
novel products and processes commercialized in a range of fields are developed by users for in-
house use. Thus, Enos (1962) reported that nearly all the most important innovations in oil 
refining were developed by user firms. Freeman (1968) found that the most widely licensed 
chemical production processes were developed by user firms. Von Hippel (1976, 1977) found 
that users were the developers of about 80 percent of the most important scientific instrument 
innovations,  and  also  the  developers  of  most  of  the  major  innovations  in  semiconductor 
processing. Pavitt (1984) found that a considerable fraction of invention by British firms was for 
in-house use. Shah (2000) found that the most commercially important equipment innovations 
in four sporting fields tended to be developed by individual users. 
Empirical studies also show that many users—from 10 percent to nearly 40 percent—
engage in developing or modifying products.  This has been documented in the case of several 
specific  types  of  industrial  products  and  consumer  products  (Urban  and  von  Hippel  1988, 
Herstatt and von Hippel 1992, Morrison et al. 2000, Lüthje et al. 2002, Lüthje 2003, 2004, Franke 
and von Hippel 2003, Franke and Shah 2003).  It has also been documented in large-scale, multi-
industry  surveys  of  process  innovation  in  both  Canada  and  the  Netherlands  (Arundel  and 
Sonntag 1999, Gault and von Hippel 2009, de Jong and von Hippel 2009).   
When taken together, the findings of all these empirical studies make it very clear that 
users have long been and are doing a lot of commercially-signficant process development and 
product modification in many fields. 
2.2:  Innovation openness 
Economic theorists have long thought that uncompensated “spillovers” of proprietary 
innovation-related  knowledge  developed  by  private  investment  will  reduce  innovators’ 
expected  profits  from  innovation  investments  –  and  so  reduce  their  willingness  to  invest.  
Accordingly,  many  nations  have  long  offered  intellectual  property  rights  grants  that  afford 
inventors some level of temporary monopoly control over their inventions. The assumption has 
been that losses incurred due to intellectual property rights grants will be more than offset by 
gains from related increases in innovation investment or innovation disclosure (Machlup and 
Penrose 1950, Penrose 1951, Foray 2004).    
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Given  this  argument,  empirical  research  should  show  innovators  striving  to  keep 
information on their innovations from being freely diffused.  However, research instead shows 
that both individuals and firms often voluntarily “freely reveal” what they have developed. 
When we say that an innovator freely reveals information about an innnovation, we mean that 
exclusive  intellectual  property  rights  to  that  information  are  voluntarily  given  up  by  the 
innovator, and all interested parties are given access to it—the information becomes a public 
good  (Harhoff  et  al  2003).    (Intellectual  property  rights  may  still  be  used  to  protect  the 
developers  of  these  public  goods  from  liability,  and  to  prevent  expropriation  of  their 
innovations by third parties (O'Mahony 2003).)  
The practices visible in open source software development were important in bringing 
the phenomenon of free revealing to general awareness. In these projects it was clear policy that 
project contributors would routinely and systematically freely reveal code they had developed 
at private expense (Raymond 1999). However, free revealing of innovations has a history that 
began  long  before  the  advent  of  open  source  software.  Allen  (1983)  and  Nuvolari  (2004), 
describe and discuss eighteenth-century examples. Contemporary free revealing by users has 
been documented by von Hippel and Finkelstein (1979) for medical equipment, by Lim (2000) 
for semiconductor process equipment, by Morrison, Roberts, and von Hippel (2000) for library 
information systems, and by Franke and Shah (2003) for sporting equipment. Gault and von 
Hippel  (2009)  and  de  Jong  and  von  Hippel  (2009)  have  shown  in  multi-industry  studies  in 
Canada and the Netherlands that user firms developing process equipment often transfer their 
innovations to process equipment suppliers without charge. 
Reexaminations  of  traditional  economic  arguments  triggered  by  evidence  of  free 
revealing show that innovators generally freely reveal for two economically rational reasons.  
First, it is in practice difficult to effectively protect most innovations via secrecy or intellectual 
property rights.  Second, significant private benefits often accrue to innovators that do freely 
reveal their innovations.   
With respect to the first point, consider that the real-world value of patent protection has 
been studied for more than 40 years.  A number of researchers have found that, except in the 
case of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and chemical processes, innovators generally do not think 
that  patents  are  very  useful  either  for  excluding  imitators  or  for  capturing  royalties.  Most 
respondents also say that the availability of patent protection does not induce them to invest 
more in research and development than they would if patent protection did not exist (Taylor 
and Silberston, 1973; Levin et al. 1987; Mansfield 1968, 1985; Cohen et al 2000, 2002; Arundel 
2001;  Sattler  2003;  Dosi  et.  al.,  2006).    Keeping  an  innovation  secret  is  also  unlikely  to  be 
successful for long – trade secrets tend to “leak” quite quickly (Mansfield 1985).  And even if    
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one innovator can manage to protect a trade secret, many generally know similar information 
that  can  serve  as  substitutes.    Some  holders  of  substitute  information  stand  to  lose  little  or 
nothing by freely revealing what they know.  As a result, efforts of those who wish to protect or 
hide their trade secrets are often undercut by those with the least to lose by free revealing (von 
Hippel 2005).   
With respect to the second point, evidence has now accumulated that innovators who 
elect to freely reveal their innovations, can gain significant private benefits – and also avoid 
some private costs.   
Regarding private benefits, consider that innovators that freely reveal their new designs 
often  find  that  others  then  improve  or  suggest  improvements  to  the  innovation,  to  mutual 
benefit (Raymond 1999, Lakhani and von Hippel, 2009). Freely revealing users also may benefit 
from enhancement of reputation, from positive network effects due to increased diffusion of 
their  innovation,  and  from  other  factors  such  as  obtaining  a  source  of  supply  for  their 
innovation  that  is  cheaper  than  in-house  production  (Allen  1983,  Lerner  and  Tirole  2002, 
Harhoff et al. 2003, Lakhani and Wolf 2005, von Hippel and von Krogh 2003).  
With  regard  to  cost,  protecting  design  information  is  generally  expensive,  requiring 
security walls and restricted access or the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Blaxill 
and Eckardt, 2009). For this reason preventing others from viewing and using a new design 
may be significantly more costly than leaving the design open for inspection or use by any 
interested party (Baldwin, 2008).  
Not surprisingly, the incentive to freely reveal decreases if the agents compete with one 
another, for example, if they are firms making the same end product or individuals competing 
in a sport (Franke and Shah, 2003; Baldwin, Hienerth and von Hippel, 2006).  Selective openness 
strategies  illustrate  this  point  nicely.  Thus,  Henkel  (2003)  has  documented  selective  free 
revealing among producers in the case of embedded Linux software.  The producers partition 
their code into open modules on which they collaborate, and closed modules on which they 
compete (Henkel and Baldwin, 2009).  
2.3  Collaboration and Modularity 
Collaboration  is  a  well-known  attribute  of  online,  multi-contributor  projects  such  as 
open source software projects and Wikipedia (Raymond, 1999; Benkler, 2002). Lakhani and von 
Hippel (2009) studied a sample of 241 software features being developed for the improvement 
of  PostgreSQL  open  source  database  software.  They  found  that  the  average  number  of 
individuals collaborating in the development of a single software feature was 9, and that on 
average 7 of these were users.  Franke and Shah (2003) studied user innovators in four sporting    
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communities and found that all had received assistance in their development efforts by at least 
one  other  user  from  their  communities.    The  average  number  of  users  assisting  each 
userinnovator was three to five. Finally, a study of process equipment innovations by high-tech 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the Netherlands conducted by de Jong and von Hippel 
(2009) found that 24% of 364 user firms drawn from a wide range of industries had received 
assistance in their innovation development work from other process equipment users. 
Modular design architectures are an important aid to collaborative work.  A modular 
system  is  one  in  which  the  elements,  which  may  be  decisions,  tasks  or  components,  are 
partitioned  into  subsets  called  modules.  Within  each  module,  elements  of  the  system  are 
densely dependent and interconnected: changing any one will require changes in many others. 
Across modules, however, elements are independent or nearly so; a change in one module by 
definition does not require changes in others (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Modular systems can 
be easily broken apart, thus Herbert Simon called such systems “near-decomposable” (Simon, 
1962). Furthermore, given appropriate knowledge, a non-modular system can be made modular 
(or near-decomposable) by creating a set of coordinating design rules that establish interfaces 
and regulate the interactions of the modules (Mead and Conway, 1980; Baldwin and Clark, 
2000).  Most  design-relevant  knowledge  and  information  does  not  need  to  cross  module 
boundaries. This is the property of “information hiding” (Parnas 1972). 
Modularity is important for collaboration in design because separate modules can be 
worked  on  independently  and  in  parallel,  without  intense  ongoing  communication  across 
modules.  Designers working on different modules in a large system do not have to be co-
located, but can still create a system in which the parts can be integrated and will function 
together  as  a  whole.    In  small  projects  or  within  modules,  designers  can  utilize  “actionable 
transparency” rather than modularity to achieve coordination.  When projects are small, each 
designer’s activities are “transparent” to his or her collaborators.  In open collaborative projects, 
modularity  and  actionable  transparency  generally  go  hand  in  hand,  with  both  factors 
contributing to the divisibility of tasks (Colfer, 2009).  
Building  on  arguments  of  Ghosh  (1998),  Raymond  (1999),  and  von  Hippel  and  von 
Krogh (2003), Baldwin and Clark (2006 b) showed formally that, if communication costs are low 
relative to design costs, then any degree of modularity suffices to cause rational innovators that 
do not compete with respect to the design being developed to prefer collaborative innovation 
over independent innovation. This result hinges on the fact that the innovative design itself is a 
non-rival good: each participant in a collaborative effort gets the value of the whole design, but 
incurs only a fraction of the design cost.  
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3. Where is Each Model Viable? 
Previous work has demonstrated the existence of the three basic ways of organizing 
innovation activity and has eludicated their characteristics. However, to our knowledge, there 
has  been  no  systematic  thinking  about  the  conditions  under  which  each  model  is  likely  to 
appear,  and  whether  each  is  expanding  or  contracting  relative  to  the  other  two.  To  make 
progress on these questions, it is necessary to develop a theoretical framework that locates all 
three models in a more general space of attributes. That is our aim in this section.  
Our methodololgy is that of comparative institutional analysis. In this diverse literature, 
laws, social customs, modes of governance, organizational forms, and industry structures are 
compared in terms of their incentives, economic consequences, and ability to survive and grow 
in  a  given  historical  setting  or  technological  context.  In  the  particular  branch  we  are  most 
concerned with, organizational forms and industry structures are taken to be endogenous and 
historically contingent (Chandler, 1962, 1977; Williamson, 1985, 1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Aoki,  1984,  2001;  Langlois,  1986a,  2002;  Baldwin  and  Clark  2000;  Jacobides,  2005).  Different 
forms  may  be  selected  to  suit  different  environments  and  then  adaptively  modified.  Thus 
organizational forms emerge in history and recede as technologies and preferences change. 
Our approach is modeled after Williamson’s (1985, 1991) analysis of different forms of 
transactional governance and especially Fama and Jensen’s (1983a, b) account of how agency 
costs affect the allocation of residual claims. However, in contrast to this prior work, we will not 
attempt  to  determine  which  model  is  most  efficient  in  terms  of  minimizing  transaction  or 
agency costs, but instead will establish bounds on the viability of each model. When more than 
one form is viable, we do not expect to see one form drive out the other (as is the common 
assumption), but rather expect to see creative combinations of the forms to take advantage of 
what each one does best. 
Finally in contrast to virtually all prior work except for Chandler (1962, 1977), we take an 
explicitly technological approach to the question of viability. Fundamentally we assume that in 
a free economy, the organizational forms that survive are ones with benefits exceeding their 
costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b). Costs in turn are determined by technology and change over 
time.  Thus  Chandler  (1977)  argues  that  the  modern  corporation  became  a  viable  form  of 
organization  (and  the  dominant  form  in  some  sectors)  as  a  consequence  of  the  (partly 
endogenous)  decline  in  production  costs  for  high-flow-through  technologies,  together  with 
(exogenous) declines in transportation and energy costs. Adopting Chandler’s logic, we should 
expect a particular organizational form to be prevalent when its technologically determined 
costs are low, and to be ascendent—i.e., growing relative to other forms—when its costs are 
declining relative to the costs of  other forms.     
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Today, design costs and communication costs are declining rapidly, and modular design 
architectures are becoming common for many products. In the rest of this section, we argue that 
these largely exogenous technological trends make single user innovation and especially open 
collaborative innovation viable across a wider range of innovation activities than was the case 
before the arrival of technologies such as personal computers and the Internet. We have seen, 
and  expect  to  continue  to  see,  single  user  innovation  and  open  collaborative  innovation 
growing in importance relative to producer innovation in most sectors of the economy. We do 
not  believe  that  producer  innovation  will  disappear,  but  we  do  expect  it  to  become  less 
pervasive and ubiquitous than was the case during most of the 20
th century. 
 
3.1 Definitions  
A single user innovator is a single firm or individual that creates an innovation in order to 
use  it.    Examples  are  a  single  firm  creating  a  process  machine  in  order  to  use  it,  and  an 
individual consumer creating a new piece of sporting equipment in order to use it.   
A producer innovator is a single, non-collaborating firm.  Producers anticipate profiting 
from their design by selling it to users or others: by definition they obtain no direct use-value 
from a new design. We assume that through secrecy or intellectual property rights a producer 
innovator has exclusive access and control over the innovation, and so is a monopolist with 
respect to its design. Examples of producer innovators are: (1) a firm or individual that patents 
an invention and licenses it to others; (2) a firm that develops a new process machine to sell to 
its customers; (3) a firm that develops an enhanced service to offer its clients.   
An  open  collaborative  innovation  project  involves  contributors  who  share  the  work  of 
generating a design and also reveal the outputs from their individual and collective design 
efforts openly for anyone to use. The defining properties of this model are twofold: (1) the 
participants  are  not  rivals  with  respect  to  the  innovative  design  (otherwise  they  would  not 
collaborate) and (2) they do not individually or collectively plan to sell products or services 
incorporating the innovation or intellectual property rights related to it.  An example of such a 
project is an open source software project.  
A design is a set of instructions that specify how to produce a novel product or service 
(Simon, 1981; Suh, 1990; Baldwin and Clark, 2000, 2006a).  These instructions can be thought of 
as a recipe for accomplishing the functional requirements of the design (Suh, 1990; Winter, 2008; 
Dosi  and  Nelson,  2009).  In  the  case  of  products  or  services  that  themselves  consist  of 
information such as software, a design for an innovation can be virtually identical to the usable 
product itself.  In the case of a physical product such as a wrench or a car, the design recipe 
must be converted into a physical form before it can be used.    
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A given mode of innovation is viable with respect to a particular innovation opportunity 
if the innovator or each participant in a group of innovators finds it worthwhile to incur the 
requisite  costs  to  gain  the  anticipated  value  of  the  innovation.    By  focusing  on  anticipated 
benefits and costs we assume that potential innovators are rational actors who can forecast the 
likely effects of their design effort and choose whether or not to expend the effort (Simon, 1981; 
Langlois, 1986b; Jensen and Meckling, 1994; Scott, 2001).  
Our definition of viability is related to: the contracting view of economic organizations; 
to the concept of solvency in finance; and to the concept of equilibrium in institutional game 
theory.   
In  contracting  literature,  firms  and  other  organizations  are  viewed  as  a  “nexus  of 
contracts,”,  that  is,  a  set  of  voluntary  agreements  (Alchian  and  Demsetz,  1972;  Jensen  and 
Meckling,  1976;  Fama  and  Jensen,  1983a,  b;  Demsetz,  1988;  Hart,  1995).  For  the  firm  or 
organization to continue in existence, each party must perceive himself or herself to be better off 
within the contracting relationship than outside of it.  
In finance, a firm assembles resources by issuing claims (contracts) in the form of debt 
and equity. It uses the proceeds to purchase assets and to bridge the gap between cash outflows 
and inflows. A firm is solvent as long as it can pay off or refinance all its debt claims and have 
something left over. If this condition is not met, the firm is bankrupt: it ceases to be a going 
concern, and must be liquidated or reorganized.  
In institutional game theory, an institution is defined as the equilibrium of a game with 
self-confirming  beliefs  (Aoki,  2001).  Within  the  institutional  framework,  participants  join  or 
contribute resources in the expectation that other parties will enact their respective roles. If all 
behave as the others expect, everyone’s initial beliefs are confirmed: the pattern of action then 
becomes a self-perpetuating institution. When the participants in the institution are rational 
actors,  one  of  their  self-confirming  beliefs  must  be,  “I  am  better  off  participating  in  this 
institutional arrangement than withdrawing from it.” On this view, a stable nexus of contracts, 
a  solvent  firm,  and  an  active  open  collaborative  innovation  project  are  all  special  cases  of 
institutional equilibria. 
We  define  an  innovation  opportunity  as  the  opportunity  to  create  a  new  design.  With 
respect to a particular innovation opportunity, each of the three models of innovation may be 
viable or not, depending on the benefits and costs flowing to the actors.  
In terms of benefits, we define the value of an innovation, V, as the benefit that a party 
expects to gain from converting an innovation opportunity into a new design—the recipe—and 
then turning the design into a useful product, process or service.  Different individuals and 
organizations may benefit in different ways.  By definition, users benefit from direct use of the    
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product, process, or service specified by the new design. Producers benefit from profitable sales, 
which  may  take  the  form  of  sales  of  intellectual  property  (a  patent  or  license)  or  sales  of 
products or services that embody the design. Ultimately, however, a producer’s benefit, hence 
value, derives from the users’ willingness to pay for the innovative design. 
Each innovation opportunity has four generic costs: design cost, communication cost, 
production  cost  and  transaction  cost.  Consistent  with  our  assumption  that  innovators  are 
rational actors, we assume that these costs (as well as benefits) are known ex ante to potential 
innovators, although there may be uncertainty in their assessments. As with value, the costs 
may differ both across individuals and across the three models of innovation.  
Design cost, d, is the cost of creating the design for an innovation—the instructions that 
when implemented will bring the innovation into reality. Following Simon (1962, 1981), these 
costs include (1) the cost of identifying the functional requirements (that is, what the design is 
supposed to do); (2) the cost of dividing the overall problem into sub-problems, which can be 
solved separately; (3) the cost of solving the sub-problems; and (4) the cost of recombining the 
sub-problems’ solutions into a functioning whole.   
Communication  cost,  c,  is  the  cost  of  transferring  design-related  information  among 
participants in different organizations during the design process. Under this definition, single user 
innovators, because they are in the same organization incur no communication cost. (Of course 
there  can  be  intra-organization  costs  of  communication.  However,  for  our  purposes  it  is 
sufficient  if  the  costs  of  communication  are  less  within  an  organization  than  across 
organizational  boundaries.)  Producer  innovators  and  innovators  collaborating  in  an  open 
project must communicate across organizations, and thus incur communication costs.  
Production  cost,  u,  is  the  cost  of  carrying  out  the  design  instructions  to  produce  the 
specified good or service. The input is the design instructions —the recipe—plus the materials, 
energy,  and  human  effort  specified  in  those  instructions;  the  output  is  a  good—the  design 
converted into usable form.  
Transaction  cost,  t,  is  the  cost  of  establishing  property  rights  and  engaging  in 
compensated exchanges of property. For an innovation, transaction cost includes the cost of 
creating  exclusive  rights  to  the  design,  by  keeping  it  secret  or  by  obtaining  a  patent  or 
copyright. It also includes the cost of controlling opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985); 
writing contracts (Hart, 1995); and accounting for transfers and compensation (Baldwin, 2008). 
 
3.2 Bounds on Viability  
Every innovation opportunity, that is, every potential new design, can be characterized 
in terms of its value and the four dimensions of cost described above. The criterion of viability    
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can thus be specified mathematically as follows: 
Bounds on Viability 1: For a given innovation opportunity, a particular model of innovation is 
viable if and only if for each necessary contributor to the model: 
Vi > di +ci +ui +ti  .                (1) 
(The subscripts indicate that the benefits and costs may vary by contributor and across 
models.) 
For single user innovators and producer innovators, there is only one contributor to be 
considered. (Producer innovators may employ many people, but the producer’s contracts with 
employees are subsumed in its costs.) In open collaborative innovation projects, however, there 
are several or many contributors, and the inequality must hold for each one individually. Notice 
we have defined the criterion as a strict inequality: we assume that the actors must anticipate a 
strictly positive gain in order to undertake the effort and cost of innovation. We do not rule out 
the possibility that the activities of design, communication, production, or exchange might be 
pleasurable for some agents: if this is the case, the relevant cost would be negative for those 
agents. However, the cases of interest here are those for which the sum of costs is positive, that 
is to say, the innovation is not a free good. 
As indicated in the introduction, design costs and communication costs have declined 
and are continuing to decline very rapidly because of the advent of personal computers and the 
Internet. We believe these largely exogenous technological trends are the main causes of the 
increasing importance of single user and open collaborative innovation models in the economy 
at large. To make this argument as clear as possible, we will first focus our analysis on these 
costs alone, holding production costs and transaction costs constant across all three economic 
models. Once we have established bounds on viability for the three models with respect to 
design and communication costs, we will reintroduce the other two dimensions of cost and 
show how they affect the results.  
To  simplify  our  notation  in  the  next  few  sections,  we  define  v  as  the  value  of  an 
innovation  opportunity  net  of  production  and  transaction  costs.  Because  it  subtracts  out 
production and transaction costs, v can be thought of as the (expected) value of the design 
alone, before it is put up for sale or converted into a useful thing.  The bounds of viability can 
then be restated as: 
Bounds on Viability 2: For a given innovation opportunity, if production and transaction 
costs are constant, a particular model of innovation is viable if and only if for each necessary 
contributor to the model: 
vi > di +ci  .                  (2) 
With this simplifying assumption, we can now represent innovation opportunities with 
different costs as points in a graph with design cost and communication cost on the x and y axes    
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respectively. We next ask the question, for what combinations of design and communication 
cost will each model be viable? 
  
3.3 Single User Innovation 
Consider  first  a  single  user  innovator  –  an  individual  or  a  firm  -  contemplating 
investment in a design whose value to her is vs. The effort of innovation is worthwhile (for this 
innovator and this design) if this value is greater than the user’s design cost:  ds < vs. In figure 1, 
we draw a vertical line at  d = vs. Points to the left of the vertical line will satisfy the constraint 
hence be viable; those to the right will not. Thus the constraint   d = vs bounds the region in 
which single user innovation is viable for this opportunity.  
As advances in design technology progressively reduce design cost (which is the trend), 
more innovation opportunities become viable for more users.  Note, however, that design costs 
of individual users will differ.  For example, if user A has better skills or equipment than user B, 
the design cost for a given innovation may fall within an attractive range for user A but not B 
(as shown in the figure).  
 
Figure 1: Bound on Single User Innovation 
 
 
Communication costs don’t enter the analysis, because the user is a single agent that 
both designs and benefits from the use of an innovation.  As was mentioned earlier, a single 
user innovator does not need to engage in inter-organization communication as part of either    
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the design process or the process of reaping value from the design. For this reason, as shown in 
figure  1,  the  institution  of  single  user  innovation  is  viable  independent  of  the  cost  of 
communication: single users will innovate even if communication technology is very primitive 
and the costs of communication are very high.  
3.4 Producer Innovation 
Producers  can  economically  justify  undertaking  larger  designs  than  can  single  users, 
because they expect to spread their design costs over many purchasers.  Even though they are 
single organizations, however, they are affected by communication costs because to sell their 
products they must make potential buyers aware of what they have to sell.  
Non-innovating users will purchase the innovation from a producer as long as their 
value is greater than the producer’s price: vi > p, where vi denotes the value of the innovation to 
the ith user, and p denotes the producer innovator’s price. (Both value and price are measured 
net of production and transaction costs.)  
As we mentioned earlier, we assume that if the producer undertakes a design effort, it 
will obtain property rights that give it some predictable degree of effective monopoly on the 
design. We also assume that the producer knows the value vi that each potential user places on 
the innovation. In other words it knows its customers’ willingness-to-pay for the innovative 
product or service and can subtract the relevant production and transaction costs from their 
willingness-to-pay.  The  producer  innovator  can  convert  this  customer  knowledge  into  a 
demand function, Q(p), which relates each price it might charge to the number of units of the 
product or service it will sell at that price (Baldwin, Hienerth and von Hippel, 2006). From the 
demand  function,  the  producer  innovator  can  solve  for  the  price,  p*,  and  quantity,  Q*,  that 
maximize its expected revenues (again net of production and transaction costs), and subtract its 
design (dp) and communication (cp) costs from (net) revenue to calculate expected profit, Π: 
Π = p*Q*−dp −cp                 (3) 
If  the  producer  anticipates  positive  profit,  then  as  a  rational  actor,  it  will  enter  the 
market  to  supply  the  innovation.  In  this  case,  the  producer  innovator  model  is  viable  with 
respect  to  the  innovation  opportunity.  Conversely,  if  its  anticipated  profit  is  negative,  the 
producer will not enter, and the producer model of innovation is not viable.  
The zero profit constraint on the producer defines a negative 45-degree line in the space 
of design and communication costs:    p*Q*= d+c. Figure 2 shows this bound in relation to a 
hypothetical single user innovator’s bound for the same opportunity. As we have drawn the 
figure, the design costs are higher than the value of the innovation to a single user, hence the 
single user innovation model is not viable for this design. We then show two possible outcomes    
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for the producer. In the first case, communication costs are low so that the sum of design and 
communication costs falls below the producer’s bound. In the second case, the sum falls above 
the bound. Producer innovation is a viable model for the first combination of costs but not for 
the second.  
 
Figure 2: Bound on Producer Innovation 
 
 
From this analysis we learn that the viability of producer innovation is affected by two 
things that don’t affect single user innovation. The first is the size of the potential market. In 
large markets, the producer will have many customers and its revenue will be far in excess of 
any single user’s value:  the producer is able to “aggregate demand.” The need to communicate 
is the second factor differentiating producer innovators from single user innovators. To sell 
goods, one’s customers have to know the innovation exists. In effect a producer innovator must 
split its (net) revenue between design cost and communication cost, and still have something 
left  over.    Thus,  if  communication  costs  fall  because  of  technological  progress,  a  producer 
innovator  may  become  viable  even  if  design  cost  stays  the  same.  (In  figure  2,  consider  the 
impact of an exogenous drop in communication cost from c2 to c1.)    
 
3.5 Open collaborative innovation 
Consider  finally  the  model  of  open  collaborative  innovation.  Recall  that  open 
collaborative innovation projects involve users and others who share the work of generating a    
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design and also reveal the outputs from their individual and collective design efforts openly for 
anyone to use. In such projects, some participants benefit from the design itself – directly in the 
case of users, indirectly in the case of suppliers or users of complements that are increased in 
value by that design.  Each of these incurs the cost of doing some fraction of the work but 
obtains  the  value  of  the  entire  design,  including  additions  and  improvements  generated  by 
others.  Other participants obtain private benefits such as learning, reputation, fun, etc that are 
not related to the project’s innovation outputs. For ease of exposition, we will derive the bounds 
of the model for user innovators first, and then consider the impact of other participants on 
those bounds. 
For the contributing user innovators, the key advantage of open collaborative innovation 
is that each contributor can undertake some of the work but rely on others to do the rest (von 
Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Baldwin and Clark, 2006 b). This ability to divide up design tasks 
eliminates the design cost bound,  d < vs, that made large-scale innovations infeasible for single 
user innovators.  
Communication costs, however, are a major concern for open collaborative innovation 
projects.  To divide their work effectively, and then to put it back together to form a complete 
design, contributors must communicate with one another rapidly and repeatedly.  This means 
that low communication costs, as recently enabled by the Internet, are critical to the viability of 
the open collaborative innovation model. 
User innovators will choose to participate in an open collaborative innovation project if 
the increased communication cost each incurs by joining the project is more than offset by the 
value  of  designs  obtained  from  others.  To  formalize  this  idea,  assume  that  a  large-scale 
innovation opportunity is perceived by a group of  N communicating designers. As rational 
actors, each member of the group (indexed by i) will estimate the value of the large design and 
parse it into two subsets: (1) that part, valued at vsi, which the focal individual can complete 
himself at a reasonable cost (by definition, vsi > dsi); and (2) that part, valued at voi, which would 
be “nice to have”, but which he cannot complete at a reasonable cost given his skills and other 
sticky information on hand (by definition voi ≤ doi ).  
We assume that member i has the option to communicate his portion of the design to 
other members and receive their feedback and complementary designs at a cost c. It makes 
sense  for  i  to  share  his  designs  if  he  expects  to  receive  more  value  from  others  than  his 
communication  cost.  His  expected  benefit  from  communicating  can  be  parsed  into  (1)  the 
probability, ρj that member j will respond in kind; (2) the fraction (αj) of the remaining design 
that member j can provide; (3) the value voi that i may obtain from others. As a rational actor, 
member i will communicate his design to the other members of the group, if:    
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ρj ⋅α j ⋅voi > c
j≠i
N−1
∑    .                  (5) 
This is the first bound on the open collaborative innovation model. It establishes the 
importance of communication cost and technology for the viability of the open collaborative 
model  of  innovation.  The  lower  the  cost  of  communicating  with  the  group,  the  lower  the 
threshold other members’ contributions must meet to justify an attempt to collaborate.  Higher 
communication  costs  affect  inequality  (5)  in  two  ways:  they  increase  the  direct  cost  of 
contributing  and  they  reduce  the  probability  that  others  will  reciprocate.  It  follows  that  if 
communication costs are high, an open collaborative project cannot get off the ground. But if 
communication  costs  are  low  for  everyone,  it  is  rational  for  each  member  of  the  group  to 
contribute designs to the general pool and expect that others will contribute complementary 
designs or improve on his own design. This is in fact the pattern observed in successful open 
source projects and other forums of open collaborative innovation (Raymond, 1999; Franke and 
Shah, 2003; Baldwin et. al. 2006; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2009). 
The second bound determines the maximum scale of the design. If there are N members 
of the group and each contributes his or her own part, the total design investment will be the 
sum of their individual design costs. The upper bound on design cost is then: 






∑      ;               (6) 
where vs  is the average value each places on his or her own portion of the design. Note that this 
bound is N times greater than the bound on the design cost of the average single user innovator. 
Thus given low-enough costs of communication, open collaborative user innovators operating 
within  a  task-divisible  and  modular  architecture  can  pursue  much  larger  innovation 
opportunities than single user innovators acting alone.  
Open collaborative projects, as we said earlier, may attract participants who are not in a 
position to benefit from the design produced by the project, but are instead motivated by such 
incentives as learning, reputation, and the fun of participation. For such contributors, the sum of 
their design cost and communication cost must be less than whatever benefit they do obtain 
from the project. Thus, instead of inequality (5), the non-user’s (nu) criterion for contributing is 
“does my expected benefit – such as reputational benefits - exceed the sum of my design and 
communication costs?” 
ρnu ⋅vnu > dnu +cnu                  (5’) 
Other  things  equal,  this  bound  is  more  likely  to  be  satified  if  the  non-users’ 
communication  costs  are  low.  Thus  communication  costs  constrain  non-user  participants  as    
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well as users. 
The presence of non-users further relaxes the bound on the scale of the design. If there 
are M non-users in addition to N users contributing to the design, the upper bound on total 







∑ + Mwnu   ;              (6’) 
where w is value of participating (net of communication cost) to the average non-user. Thus the 
scale  of  an  open  collaborative  project  is  expanded—and  may  be  greatly  expanded—by 
attracting non-users who value learning, fun, reputation, etc. more than the design itself. 
All in all, the two bounds indicate both the limitations and the possibilities associated 
with the open collaborative innovation model. The first bound [(5) and (5’)] shows that this 
mode of innovation is severely restricted by communication costs. If the value of the “other” 
part of the system is low or the expectation that others will actually contribute is low relative to 
the cost of communication, single user innovators will “stick to their knitting” and not attempt 
to  collaborate,  and  non-user  participants  will  find  some  other  outlet  for  their  talents.  But  if 
communication costs are low enough to clear these hurdles, then the second bound [(6) and (6’)] 
shows  that,  using  a  modular  design  architecture  as  a  means  of  coordinating  their  work,  a 
collaborative group can develop an innovative design that is many times larger in scale than 
any single member of the group could manage alone. 
Figure  3  places  all  three  models  of  innovation—single  user  innovation,  producer 
innovation and open collaborative innovation—in the same figure. The shadings and text in the 
figure indicate areas in which one, two or all three models are viable. Basically, single user 
innovation  is  viable  when  design  costs  are  low,  for  any  level  of  communication  cost.  Open 
collaborative innovation is viable when communication costs are low, for high levels of design 
cost, as long as the design can be divided into modules that one or a few contributors can work 
on independently. Producer innovation is viable when the sum of design and communication 
costs falls below the producer’s expected net revenue as indicated by the negative 45-degree 
line. 
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Figure 3: Bounds of viability for all three innovation models 
3.6 Bringing Back Production and Transaction Costs 
At the beginning of this section, in order to focus on the contrasting effects of design and 
communication costs on the three models of innovation, we made the simplifying assumption 
that production costs and transaction costs were similar across all three, and so had no effect on 
any model’s viability relative to the other two. We did this by defining the value of the design 
(vi) as the total value of the innovation to the innovator (Vi) minus the costs of production and 
transactions: 
vi ≡Vi −ui −ti    .                (7) 
(Subscripts indicate that values and costs may differ across individuals and models.) 
From  this  definition  it  is  clear  that  if  production  costs  or  transaction  costs  are 
systematically higher for a particular model of innovation, then for the same willingness-to-pay 
(Vi),  there  will  be  less  value  in  the  design  (vi)  to  cover  the  “upstream”  costs  of  design  and 
communication. The range of viability for the model with higher costs is then reduced. In terms 
of the bounds derived above, the single user innovator’s bound would move to the left, the 
producer’s bound would move toward the origin; and the open colloborative project’s bounds 
would move both down and left. 
We now consider whether there are systematic differences in production or transaction 
costs across the three models.  
Production  Costs.  At  the  start  of  this  section,  we  explained  that  a  design  is  the 
information required to produce a novel product or service – the “recipe.”  For products that 
themselves  consist  of  information  such  as  software,  production  costs  are  simply  the  cost  of    
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copying and instantiating the design. For digitized products and services, these costs are very 
low.  In the case of a physical products, however, the design recipe must be converted into a 
physical form before it can be used.  In such cases, the input is the design instructions —the 
recipe—plus the materials, energy, and human effort specified in those instructions; the output 
is a good—the design converted into usable form. 
One of the major advantages producers have historically had over single user innovators 
and open collaborative innovation projects is, of course, economies of scale with respect to mass 
production technologies. Mass production, which became widespread in the early 20
th Century 
is a set of techniques whereby certain physical products can be turned out in very high volumes 
at very low unit cost (Chandler, 1977). The economies of scale in mass production generally 
depend on using a single design (or a small number of designs) over and over again. In classic 
mass  production,  changing  designs  interrupts  the  flow  of  products  and  causes  setup  and 
switching costs, which reduce the overall efficiency of the process. There is no room for variety, 
as indicated by Henry Ford’s famous quote, “[A] customer can have a car painted any color ... 
so long as it is black.” (Ford, 1922, Chapter 4.) 
Can  single  user  innovators  or  open  collaborative  innovation  projects,  convert  their 
various  designs  into  a  physical  products  that  will  be  economically  competitive  with  the 
products  of  mass  producers?    Increasingly,  the  answer  is  ‘Yes’.    Consider  that,  today, 
modularization  is  affecting  the  interface  between  design  and  production,  as  well  as  the 
interfaces between design tasks.  This means that mass producers can design their production 
technologies  to  be  independent  of  many  of  the  specifics  of  the  designs  they  produce.  Such 
processes are said to provide “mass customization” (Pine, 1993; Tseng and Piller, 2003). When 
mass customization is possible—that is, when designs are no longer for technical reasons tied to 
production  technologies—producers  can    in  principle  make  their  low-cost,  high-throughput 
factories available for the production of designs created by single users and collaborative open 
projects.   
Some producers might resist this idea, wanting to capture profits from a proprietary 
design  as  well  as  proprietary  production  capabilities.    But,  if  there  is  competition  among 
producers, some will be willing to produce outside designs as well as their own and forgo the 
rents they formerly obtained from proprietary designs.  Indeed, this possibility is manifest in 
many  industries  where  “toll”  production  is  common.    For  example,  “silicon  fabs”  produce 
custom  designs  to  order  via  very  sophisticated  and  expensive  production  processes,  as  do 
producers of specialty chemicals. 
Nevertheless, even when it is technically feasible to modularize design and production, 
users might still value standardized goods and services that are reliably the same in different    
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places and at different times. In effect, the value of innovation for such goods and services is 
low  relative  to  the  value  of  other  attributes  such  as  safety,  familiarity,  or  guaranteed 
performance. Single user innovators and open collaborative innovation projects are not well-
suited  to  designing  mass-produced  products  requiring  product-specific  production  systems. 
Thus  we  expect  producer  innovators  to  continue  to  have  an  advantage  in  designing  and 
producing mass-produced goods and services for large numbers of people.  
Transaction costs. If producer innovators have a production cost advantage for some 
(but  not  all)  production  technologies,  free-revealing  single  user  and  open  collaborative 
innovators have an advantage with respect to transaction costs. As indicated, the transaction 
costs of innovation include the cost of establishing exclusive rights over the innovative design, 
for example through secrecy or by obtaining a patent. Also included are the costs of protecting 
the design from theft: for example, by restricting access, and enforcing non-compete agreements 
(Teece, 2000; Marx, Strumky and Fleming, 2009). Finally transaction costs include the costs of 
legally  transferring  rights  to  the  good  or  service  embodying  the  innovation,  receiving 
compensation,  and  protecting  both  sides  against  opportunism  (Williamson,  1985;  Baldwin, 
2008). 
Producer innovators must incur transaction costs. By definition, they obtain revenue and 
resources  from  compensated  exchanges  with  users,  employees,  suppliers,  and  investors.  A 
considerable amount of analysis in the fields of economics, management, and strategy considers 
how to minimize transaction costs by rearranging the boundaries of firms or the structure of 
products and processes. (For reviews of this literature, see Williamson, 2000, and LaFontaine 
and  Slade,  2007.)  The  bottom  line  is  that  for  producer  innovators,  transaction  costs  are  an 
inevitable “cost of doing business.” 
Single  user innovators incur transaction costs when they seek to assert exclusive rights 
over their innovative designs. Patents on internal processes and equipment, the enforcement of 
secrecy  and  “need-to-know”  policies  within  a  firm,  and  non-compete  agreements  with  key 
employees  are  all  visible  evidence  of  transaction  costs  that  single  user  innovators  incur  to 
protect  valuable  intellectual  capital.  In  such  cases,  as  rational  actors,  single  user  innovators 
would  have  to  find  a  net  gain  after  subtracting  both  design  and  transaction  costs  from  the 
expected value of an innovative design to themselves. 
However,  single  user  innovators  have  a  choice  as  to  which  innovations  are  worth 
protecting and which are not. As discussed in the literature review, empirical research suggests 
that  single  users  innovators  generally  do  not  treat  all  or  even  most  of  their  innovations  as 
valuable property that must be sequestered within their walls. They often find it more practical 
and profitable to freely reveal their designs, in order to achieve network effects, reputational    
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advantages,  and  other  benefits.  By  definition,  when  single  user  innovators  freely  reveal  an 
innovation, they do not incur transaction costs, and the region of viability for the innovation 
opportunity is thereby expanded. 
Open collaborative innovation projects do not sell products nor do they pay members 
for their contributions. In this respect, they do not incur transaction costs of exchange. However, 
when an open collaborative project becomes large and successful, its members generally find 
that  they  must  incur  costs  to  protect  the  now-valuable  design  from  malfeasance  and 
expropriation. For example, virtually all large open source projects have a system of hierarchical 
access  that  prevents  anyone  from  changing  the  master  copy  of  the  source  code  without 
authorization  by  a  trusted  member  of  the  project.  The  General  Public  License  (GPL)  was 
explicitly designed to protect the rights of users to view, modify and distribute code derived 
from the licensed code (Stallman, 2002; O’Mahony 2003). The costs of restricting access and of 
editorial review, and the costs of enforcing the GPL are like classic transaction costs in that they 
assert and enforce property rights in order to prevent vandalism and theft.  
Notwithstanding these necessary expenditures, open collaborative innovation projects 
do avoid the “mundane transaction costs” of defining, counting and paying for goods in formal 
legal transactions (Baldwin, 2008). Their contributors do not have to figure out what to sell, how 
much to charge, or how to collect payment — costly activities that producers must perform in 
the normal course of business. In this respect, open collaborative innovation projects (and free 
revealing single user innovators) have a transaction cost advantage over producer innovators. 
Regulation is also a transaction cost. Drugs, commercial aircraft, and automobiles are 
among the product types that must meet heavy safety-related regulatory burdens before being 
allowed to enter the marketplace.  Regulation in the form of standard-setting affects many other 
industries such as telecommunications.  Within our theoretical framework, one can think of 
regulation and standard-setting as tending to move design and communication costs upward, 
possibly  taking  them  outside  the  bounds  of  viability  for  single  user  and  open  collaborative 
innovators, into the region where producers alone are viable.  
 
4. Discussion 
There is a widespread and longstanding perception among academics, policy makers 
and  practitioners  that  producer  innovation  is  the  primary  mode  of  innovation  in  market 
economies.  In this view, innovations are undertaken by firms that can aggregate demand, or 
not at all.  In the 1930s, Joseph Schumpeter placed producers at the center of his theory of 
economic development, saying: “It is … the producer who as a rule initiates economic change, 
and consumers are educated by him if necessary.” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 65.) Sixty years later,    
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David Teece echoed Schumpeter: “In market economies, the business firm is clearly the leading 
player in the development and commercialization of new products and processes” (Teece, 1996, 
p. 193; see also 2002, p. 36). William Baumol placed innovation at the center of his theory of 
oligopolistic competition: “in major sectors of US industry, innovation has increasingly grown 
in relative importance as a instrument used by firms to battle their competitors” (Baumol, 2002, 
p. 35).  
However,  like  all  human  endeavors,  the  organizations  and  institutions  that  create 
innovations are historically contingent. They are solutions to the problems of a specific time and 
place using the technologies of that time and place.  It is the case that, until quite recently, 
centralized  groups  within  firms  were  the  most  economical  way  to  design  mass-produced 
products and related production processes.  Four technological factors contributed to the pre-
eminence  of  mass-produced  products  in  the  economy.  First,  computational  resources  were 
scarce thus the cost of creating individual designs was quite high. Second, there was a close tie 
between design of items to be produced and the complex requirements of mass production 
technologies. Third, modular design methods were not well understood. And fourth, cheap, 
rapid  communication  enabling  distributed  design  among  widely  separated  participants  in  a 
design process was not technically possible.  Taken together, these factors made it cheaper to 
design mass-produced products centrally, and in conjunction with the manufacturing processes 
that would be used to produce them. Given these conditions, it is reasonable to speculate that 
Schumpeter and later Teece and Baumol were simply observing the most visible innovation 
processes  of  their  times  when  they  stated  that  producers  (business  firms)  were  the  leading 
developers of innovation in market economies. 
Today, as was mentioned earlier, conditions facing would-be innovators are changing 
rapidly and radically. Just as the rise of producer innovation was enabled by interdependencies 
beween centralized product design and the technologies of mass production, today the rapid 
growth of single user and open collaborative innovation is being assisted by technologies that 
both  enhance  the  capabilities  of  individual  designers  and  support  distributed,  collaborative 
design  projects.  These  technologies  include:  powerful  personal  computers,  standard  design 
languages, representations, and tools; the digitization of design information; modular design 
architectures;  and  low-cost  any-to-any  and  any-to-all  communication  via  the  Internet.    Of 
course,  we  should  remember  that  the  institutions  of  single  user  and  open  collaborative 
innovation have long existed (Rosenberg 1976; von Hippel 1976; Shah 2005). However, they are 
growing more prominent today because of the largely exogenous technological developments 
just mentioned.   
Technological trends suggest that both design costs and communication costs will be    
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further reduced over time.  To visualize this effect in terms of the bounds on viability of the 
three  institutions  we  have  been  discussing  here,  imagine  figure  3  being  populated  with 
numerous points each representing an innovation opportunity. As design and communication 
costs fall, each point would move down and to the left. As a result of this general movement, 
some  points  would  cross  the  thresholds  of  viability  for  single  user  and  open  collaborative 
innovation.  Increasing  standardization  and  conversion  of  some  designs  from  small-scale  to 
mass  production  would  cause  some  points  to  move  in  the  opposite  direction,  against  the 
general trend. But for the most part, technological progress along both dimensions of cost will 
have the effect of moving whole classes of innovation opportunities from the region where only 
producer  innovation  is  viable  to  regions  where  single  user  innovation  or  collaborative 
innovation are also viable.  In these cases, what was previously a dominant model—the only 
feasible  way  to  cover  the  costs  of  innovation—becomes  subject  to  competition  from  other, 
newly  viable  models.  This  means  that  producer  innovators  increasingly  must  contend  with 
single  user  innovators  and  open,  collaborative  innovation  projects  as  alternative  sources  of 
innovative products, processes and services. 
Prior research allows us to elaborate on this basic pattern in several interesting ways, as 
we discuss next. 
 
4.1  Interactions between the three models 
From figure 3 it is evident that for some combinations of design and communication 
costs, two or even all three models of innovation will be viable. How will the presence of one 
influence the other(s)? In other words, how will the models interact? 
When single user innovation and producer innovation are both viable, the single user 
innovators must evaluate an innovation opportunity, not only in relation to their design cost, 
but also in relation to the producer’s product and price. If the producer offers a good-enough 
product  at  a  low-enough  price,  purchasing  the  innovation  may  dominate  developing  it  in-
house, and some single user innovators may switch to becoming customers of the producer. 
(This happens regularly when companies switch from custom software developed by an in-
house IT department to off-the-shelf, purchased software.) To attract users who can innovate on 
their own, a producer’s price must be less than the user’s design cost, which by definition is less 
than the user’s value:  p < ds < vs . Given users with a range of design capabilities and costs, 
rational producers are likely to target as customers users with high design costs, and leave 
single user innovators to work out their own solutions.  
Because  of  their  distinct  roles,  it  is  possible  for  producer  innovators  and  single  user 
innovators to have a symbiotic relationship. Empirical studies have shown that most single user    
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innovation is done by a subset of all users called “lead users” that are ahead of the bulk of the 
market with respect to an important trend and also have a high incentive to innovate to solve 
needs they encounter at the leading edge (von Hippel 1986). Often, lead users have no interest 
in commercializing their innovations.  However, these innovations may serve as an attractive 
source of field-tested product prototypes for producers.  By monitoring and incorporating lead 
user innovations into their own offerings, producer innovators may enhance their product and 
service  offerings,  while  at  the  same  time  reducing  their  design  costs  and  increasing  their 
likelihood of success in the marketplace (Lilien et al 2002, von Hippel 2005).   
User innovations that are widely distributed at no cost can also become an important 
source  of  complementary  products  for  producers.    For  example,  open  source  software  has 
become  an  important  complementary  source  of  code  for  many  software  producers.  In  the 
presence of open source codebases, a software producer can focus on developing one or a few 
modules  of  a  larger  system,  without  leaving  itself  vulnerable  to  the  threat  of  holdup  by 
suppliers of complementary code (Baldwin, 2008; Henkel and Baldwin, 2009).  
 
4.2 Hybrid innovation models 
Hybrids  of  the  three  basic  models  thrive  in  the  real  world.    This  is  because  the 
architecture of a design to achieve a given function can often take a number of forms – and 
different architectures may be suited to development by one or a combination of our three basic 
models.  For example, producers or users can choose to modularize a product architecture into a 
mix of large, monolithic elements suitable for investment only by producers, plus many smaller 
elements suited for development by single user innovators or open collaborative innovation 
projects.   We can see this pattern when producers develop expensive and complex platforms 
such as central processing unit (cpu) chips for computers.  Software that runs on standardized 
cpus is developed by single users, by for-profit producers, and by open collaborative projects. 
However, to date, the cpu chips themselves have been developed as monolithic projects by 
single producers such as Intel (Colwell, 2005).  Another example is the development of software 
“engines” for computer games by producer firms, upon which platform individual gamers or 
groups of gamers acting collaboratively develop “mods” (Jeppesen 2004). 
Large,  monolithic  innovation  design  projects,  which  have  traditionally  been  in  the 
producer-only zone of figure 3 may be shifted to other regions of the figure not only as a result 
of steady declines in design and communication costs, but also as a result of the re-architecting 
of traditional, producer-centered design approaches.  For example, drug development costs are 
commonly  argued  to  be  so  high  that  only  a  producer  innovator,  buttressed  by  strong 
intellectual property protection for drugs, can succeed.  Increasingly however, we are learning    
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how  to  subdivide  drug  trials—a  large  cost  traditionally  borne  by  drug  producers—into 
elements  suitable  for  voluntary,  unpaid  participation  by  users  acting  within  a  collaborative 
open innovation framework.  This possibility has recently been illustrated in a trial of the effects 
of  lithium  on  ALS  (Lou  Gehrig’s  disease)  carried  out  by  ALS  patients  themselves  with  the 
support of a toolkit and website developed by the firm PatientsLikeMe.  
 
4.3 Implications for social welfare  
New knowledge is a non-rival, partially excludable good (Romer, 1990). The use of a 
design by one person does not inherently preclude its use by others. With rare exceptions such 
as  the  design  of  dangerous  goods,  society  benefits  if  designs  are  public  goods,  available  to 
anyone to use or study at no charge (Machlup and Penrose, 1950; Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962).  
However, from the time of the Enlightenment, many have held the view that providing 
inventors  with  incentives  in  the  form  of  property  rights  to  their  “writings  and  discoveries” 
would induce them to invest in the creation of useful new ideas, i.e., innovations. This theory 
was expressed in the U.S. Constitution, which sanctioned the creation of intellectual property: 
“[Congress shall have the power] — To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing  for  limited  Times  to  Authors  and  Inventors  the  exclusive  Right  to  their  respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” Abraham Lincoln, himself the holder of a patent, approved: “The 
patent system … added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius, in the discovery and production 
of new and useful things.” (Lincoln 1858).   
Of course, it was also known that grants of intellectual property rights would create 
undesirable  monopolies.  Producers  create  deadweight  losses  when  they  exploit  intellectual 
property rights to reap monopoly profits and spend money to protect or extend their monopoly 
positions.  Indeed  while  a  system  of  intellectual  property  rights  was  enshrined  in  the  U.S. 
Constitution,  patent systems were extremely controversial in Europe during the second half of 
the 19
th century. (Machlup and Penrose, 1950; Penrose, 1951; MacLeod, 2007.)  
The work in this paper and that of many others, suggests that this traditionally-struck 
‘devil’s  bargain’  may  not  be  beneficial.    First,  there  is  increasing  evidence  that  intellectual 
property protection does not increase innovation.  As we saw in section 2.2, studies carried out 
over  40  years  do  not  find  that  firm  managers  are  inclined  to  increase  their  innovation 
investments due to the availability of patent grant protections.  There are also many examples in 
which  strong  intellectual  property  rights  may  have  impeded  subsequent  progress  (Dosi, 
Marengo and Pasquali, 2006; Merges and Nelson, 1994).  Indeed, recent empirical work has 
actually  shown  a  negative r elationship  between  patenting  and  subsequent  progress  in  both 
biotechnology (Murray and Stern 2007) and software (Bessen and Meurer 2008).  Second, the    
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ascendent user and open collaborative innovation models that we have discussed in this paper 
mean that alternatives that are open by participants’ free choice – and to the economic benefit of 
those  participants  –  are  now  ascendent  alternatives  to  the  traditional,  closed  producer 
innovation model.  And openness, as we noted above, increases social welfare, other things 
equal. 
 
4.4 Implications for government policy 
If open collaborative innovation and open innovation by single users are indeed social 
welfare-enhancing  relative  to  closed  producer  innovation  and  closed  user  innovation,  an 
important  question  for  policymakers  then  immediately  emerges:  Are  government  policies 
currently at least even-handed with respect to these innovation models?  Or do they on balance 
encourage  closed  innovation  relative  to  open  user  and  open  collaborative  innovation?  We 
suspect the latter is the case.  
Essentially  all  governments  have  invested  heavily  to  create  the  intellectual  property 
rights infrastructure needed for innovators to either maintain exclusivity in the use of their 
innovations or to sell them for a fee. Indeed, even today there is an impetus in public policy in 
many  countries  to  strengthen  intellectual  property  rights  in  order  to  foster  innovation.  (See 
Blaxill  and  Eckardt,  2009,  Chapter  8,  on  efforts  to  strengthen  intellectual  property  rights  in 
China, India and Japan.)   
Beyond such infrastructural investments, governmental incentives and exhortations to 
obtain and use intellectual property rights are endemic.  For example, departments of the US 
government allow – one might even say encourage - firms and individuals to retain title to 
inventions  developed  with  government  funds,  in  order  to  “promote  commercialization  of 
federally funded inventions” (NIH 2003).  Government-funded business assistance programs 
also  invariably  teach  that  acquiring  intellectual  property  rights  is  the  sensible,  business-like 
thing to do.  Thus SCORE, a non-profit business advisory organization funded by the U.S. Small 
Business Administration advises: “5 Tips on Patents  If your company has an invention that you 
think is patentable, take steps at once. You may lose your right to patent it if you offer it for sale 
or disclose it publicly without patent protection.” (SCORE 2008) 
The  roots  of  this  apparent  bias  in  favor  of  closed,  producer-centered  innovation  are 
certainly understandable – the ascendent models of innovation we have discussed in this paper 
were less prevalent before the radical decline in design and communication costs brought about 
by computers and the Internet. But once the welfare-enhancing benefits of open single user 
innovation and open collaborative innovation are understood, policymakers can – and we think 
should - take steps to offset any existing biases.  Examples of useful steps are easy to find.    
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First, as was mentioned earlier, intellectual property rights grants can be used as the 
basis for licenses that help keep innovation open as well as keep it closed (O’Mahony 2003).  
Policymakers  can  add  support  of  “open  licensing”  infrastructures  such  as  the  Creative 
Commons license for writings, and the General Public License for open source software code, to 
the tasks of existing intellectual property offices.  More generally, they should seek out and 
eliminate points of conflict between present intellectual property policies designed to support 
closed innovation, but that at the same time inadvertently interfere with open innovation.   
Second, as design costs fall, many more innovations will originate with single users.   
Unlike  participants  in  open  collaborative  innovation  projects  many  single  users  have  no 
institutionalized system for sharing.  They share or do not share ad hoc. Policymakers should 
therefore develop systems to encourage and support free revealing of innovations by single 
user innovators.  They could, for example, institute a system of tax credits analogous to R&D 
tax credits for innovators that freely reveal well-documented results of their private innovation 
developments.    Documentation  of  qualifying  innovations  might  take  a  form  analogous  to  a 
patent, vetted for novelty by patent office examiners, and then granted “open patent” status. 
Third, just as in the case of single user innovators discussed previously, it would be 
useful  to  create  policies  that  reward  openness  by  sponsors  of  collaborative  projects.  Many 
collaborative innovation projects exist in which the innovation-related information generated is 
closed rather than open. How is this possible? Basically there are two reasons why the outputs 
generated by a collaborative innovation project are open rather than closed.  In the first place, 
when project participants are users of project output, open access to that output is an incentive 
that induces them to participate (see the analysis in section 3.5 above).  In the second place, 
when  effective  problem-solving  requires  contributors  to  know  and  understand  the  solution 
being developed, open access is the low-cost default solution.   
Sponsors  of  collaborative  projects  can  close  and  own  the  innovative  output  of  a 
collaborative project if they can create a project that escapes these two constraints.  To escape 
the first, sponsors can create incentives that will attract non-user contributors to their project.  
For  example,  they  can  offer  payment,  or  process-related  rewards  such  as  learning  or  fun 
(Raymond, 1999; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Benkler 2006). To escape the 
second constraint, project sponsors can employ an extreme form of modularity in which no 
participant knows (or needs to know) what the others are doing, and only the sponsor sees 
everything.   
Finally,  open  collaborative  innovation  projects  thrive,  as  we  have  seen,  upon  low 
communication costs.  In recent history, these low costs have resulted from steady advances in 
Internet distribution capabilities in conjunction with open standards. A lack of policy attention    
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to these critical infrastructural factors can threaten or reverse this progress. For example, a firm 
that owns both a channel and content (e.g., a cable network) may have strong incentives to shut 
out or discriminate against open content in favor of content it owns. The transition from the 
chaotic, fertile early days of radio in the United States when many voices were heard, to an era 
in which the spectrum was dominated by a few major networks—a transition pushed by major 
firms and enforced by governmental policy making—provides a sobering example of what can 
happen (Lessig 2001). It will be important for policy makers to be aware of this kind of incentive 
problem and address it—in this case perhaps by mandating “net neutrality,” or that ownership 
of content and ownership of channel be separated, as has long been the case for other types of 
common carriers (Zittrain 2009). 
We conclude by observing again that we belive we are in the midst of a major paradigm 
shift: technological trends are causing a change in the way innovation gets done in advanced 
market economies.  As design and communication costs exogenously decline, single user and 
open collaborative innovation models will be viable for a steadily wider range of design.  They 
will present an increasing challenge to the traditional paradigm of producer-based design – but, 
when open, they are good for social welfare and should be encouraged. 
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